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ABSTRACT 
The mining and energy sectors are particularly publicly sensitive sectors 
and subject to a high degree of public scrutiny. Evan and Freeman (1993) 
suggest that such public scrutiny needs may be better met by having direct 
public stakeholder representation on the board of directors. Similarly, 
Bilimoria (2000) argues a strong commercial case for engaging women 
on boards. This paper investigates the number and proportion of non equity 
holding public stakeholder directors and the number and proportion of 
women directors on the boards of Australian mining and energy company 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and reports a paucity of public stakeholder 
directors and also a low proportional female representation on such IPO 
boards. 
1. Introduction 
Since Freeman (1984) challenged businesses to recognise the range of 
stakeholders associated with their organisations a good deal of literature 
has developed in this area. Two noteable studies, Evan and Freeman (1993) 
and Luoma and Goodstein (1999) have even argued that companies would 
benefit substantially by engaging public stakeholder directors on their 
boards. In a similar vein, Burke (1994), Burke (1997), Bilimoria (2000), 
Burke (2003) and Stephenson (2004) argue that engaging women on boards 
would also be beneficial. While these authors suggest women are 
community and socially responsible, Catalyst (2004) also argues that firms 
with more women on their top management teams had a substantially better 
return on equity than those companies with fewer women. Farrell and Hirsch 
(2005) confirm that women tend to serve on better financially performing 
boards. 
If such tangible superior financial results are apparent by engaging women 
on boards and the wider social responsibilities of firms can be better met 
by engaging public stakeholder directors and women directors, then we 
would expect some representation of both of these categories of director 
on boards. Because mining and energy companies are particularly publicly 
sensitive industry sectors and subject to a high degree of public scrutiny 
and initial public offerings (IPOs) subject to investor scrutiny also, we would 
almost certainly expect to find public stakeholder directors and women 
directors on the boards of mining and energy IPOs. 
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This paper follows some early exploratory work by Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) which analysed board stakeholder and gender composition data for 
both industrial company and mining company IPOs for the four years from 
1994 to 1997. This research extends and makes more recent the dataset 
by a further seven years. It determines and analyses the number and 
proportion of public stakeholder directors and women directors on the boards 
of the mining and energy IPOs in Australia from 1994 to 2004. Surprisingly, 
this study finds a paucity of non equity holding public stakeholder directors 
and few women directors in these industry sectors. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises 
some related stakeholder and gender literature. Section 3 reports the 
findings. Section 4 contains our conclusions. 
2. Related Literature. 
2.1 Some Stakeholder and Stakeholder Director Literature 
Freeman (1984), Clarkson (1995) and Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) have 
encouraged organisations to consider the needs and expectations of non 
equity holding stakeholders. Such stakeholders include customers, 
suppliers, employees and government and community representatives. 
Berman et al (1999) confirm that stakeholder relationships with the above 
categories of stakeholder are important and related to the financial 
performance of firms. 
Jones and Goldberg (1982), Evan and Freeman (1993) and more recently 
Luoma and Goodstein (1999) argue that non equity holding stakeholders 
should be represented on boards, particularly boards of publicly listed 
companies so as to uphold the interests of the abovementioned 
stakeholders. Luoma and Goodstein (1999) examine 224 New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) companies during 1984 to 1994 and identify two non 
equity holding classifications. They identify those stakeholders the company 
has a business relationship with such as customers, suppliers and financiers 
and classify these as 'private' stakeholders. They then identify 'public' 
stakeholders, or those the company might believe have some public interest, 
such as government officials, community representatives and academics. 
Luoma and Goodstein (1999) report that while the proportion of private 
stakeholder directors has remained at around 5% of board seats from 1984 
to 1994, the proportion of public stakeholder boards seats has grown from 
9% to 11 % over that time period. 
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Dimovski and Brooks (2004) analyse the board composition of 270 
Australian industrial and mining company IPOs over the period 1994 to 
1997. By identifying professional directors such as lawyers, accountants, 
engineers and geologists as private stakeholders, Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) find only around 1 % of directors are non equity holding public 
stakeholder directors. 
Some Women Director Literature 
Three recent studies, in Australia, the U.K and the U.S. identify the relatively 
low proportion of women directors on the boards of publicly listed companies 
in those countries. Sheridan (2002) examined 1047 listed Australian 
companies in 2000 to find that women hold only around 3.4% of board 
seats in these companies. Singh and Vinnicombe (2003) examine the top 
100 listed companies in the U.K. in 2002 to find that women hold around 
7.6% of board seats. Catalyst (2003) examined the top 500 listed companies 
in the U. S. in 2003 to find that women hold around 13.6% of board seats. 
Singh and Vinnicombe (2003) report the governments of Norway and 
Sweden want higher female representation and have now legislated for 
greater female representation. Sweden has legislated that women hold 
25% of board seats of public companies by the end of 2004 while Norway 
is seeking to have women hold 40% of board seats by July 2005. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2004) also find a relatively low proportion of women 
on the boards of Australian IPOs. For the industrial and mining company 
IPOs of 1994 to 1997 they find that women represent only around 4% of 
board seats. In a later study, Dimovski and Brooks (2005) investigate 
whether the gender composition of the boards of large Australian industrial 
and mining companies has changed from the time of the IPO to some five 
to eight years later when the company is recorded as a top 500 company 
on the Australian stock market. They report no significant change in the 
proportion of female directors, implying that the capital market is generally 
satisfied by the gender composition of boards at the time of the IPO. 
Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) investigate some theoretical explanations 
for the low female representation. They deny that women lack ambition, 
experience or commitment and argue as social identity theory suggests, 
that male directors would prefer directors with similar corporate backgrounds 
and experience as themselves. Women directors appear to indeed have 
similar corporate backgrounds and experience as their male counterparts. 
The size of firms also appears to be important to the numbers and 
proportions of women directors. Catalyst (2003) in the U.S. and Singh, 
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Vinnicombe and Johnson (2001) in the UK both find that larger organizations 
(measured by market capitalization and/or by employees and/or by 
revenues) employ more directors and proportionally more women directors. 
3. Findings 
The primary source of the data was the Connect 4 Prospectuses database. 
Stakeholder and gender data was located in each of the prospectuses 
from 1994 to 2004. Table 1 reports around $5.02 billion was raised by 
these mining and energy IPOs over this period. The total row reports details 
of board composition by stakeholder type and by capital raising (size) for 
our dataset of 260. Of the 1059 directors in total, only one company had a 
public stakeholder director identified on the board. There were 111 
professional directors (who are classified as private stakeholder directors) 
while the other 947 were shareholder directors or option holding directors 
and therefore equity interested. In brief, nearly 90% ofthe directors of mining 
and energy IPOs over the 11 years 1994 to 2004 were to hold an equity 
interest in the listed entity at the time of listing. The other 10% of directors 
were business professionals to be paid director's fees (most in the tens of 
thousands of dollars per year) for their work. There was virtually no non 
equity holding public stakeholder directors. We have included the public 
stakeholder director in with the professional directors but identified with an 
asterisk the profile of where this person fits in terms of size of firm in table 
1 or type of firm in table 3. 
The data is also disaggregated into 4 subsets or capital raising sizes with 
nearly equal numbers of IPOs in each. Perfect quartiles unfortunately could 
not be achieved because of the heavy clustering of capital raisings at the 
million or half million dollar sizes. The numbers and percentages within 
each of these subsets all relate to the population of 1059 directors. We find 
that smaller IPOs employ fewer directors (around 3.7 members) while the 
larger mining and energy IPOs employ around 4.9 members. This is 
consistent with the argument that larger organisations employ more 
directors. We also find that smaller firms employ proportionally more 
shareholder directors and fewer professional directors than larger firms. 
This may be to contain outside payments (costs) to these professional 
directors. 
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Table 1: Board Composition by Stakeholder Type and Capital Raised. 
Sample Size· 1994 to 2004 
260 Directors 
Companies by Shareholder Option Professional Total 
Proceeds Directors Holding Directors Directors 
Raised Directors 
To $3.49m 196 26 13 235 
N =64 (18.5%) (2.5%) (1.2%) (22.2%) 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave.per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$171.9m 3.1 members 0.4 members 0.2 members 3.7 members 
$3.5m to $4.9m 184 31 14 229 
N = 61 (17.4%) (2.9%) (1.3%) (21.6%) 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$242.0m 3.0 members 0.5 members 0.2 members 3.7 members 
$5mto $7.4m 202 37 29 268 
N + 68 (19.1%) (3.5%) (2.7%) (25.3%) 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$382.3m 3.0 members 0.5 members 0.4 members 3.9 members 
$7.5m to $1.3bill 218 53 56 • 327 
N = 67 (20.6%) (5.0%) (5.3%) (30.9% 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$4227.9 million 3.3 members 0.8 members 0.8 members 4.9 members 
Total 800 147 112 1059 
$5024.1 m (75.6%) (13.9%) (10.5%) (100.0%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
3.1 members 0.6 members 0.4 members 4.1 members 
* 1 public stakeholder director included. 
Table 2 reports the board composition by gender and capital raised. From 
this data it is not clear that larger firms employ more women directors. 
What is clear is that not many women directors are employed at all in these 
mining and energy IPOs. Only 1.3% of board seats are held by women. 
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Table 2: Board Composition by Gender and Capital Raised. 
Sample Size - 260 1994 to 2000 Directors 
Companies by Men Women Total Proceeds Raised 
To$3.499m 234 2 236 
N=64 (22.1%) (0.2%) (22.3%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
3.7 members 0.0 members 3.7 members 
$3.5m to $4.9m 228 1 229 
N = 61 (21.5%) (0.1%) (21.6%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
3.7 members 0.0 members 3.7 members 
$5m to $7.4m 260 8 260 
N =68 (24.6%) (0.7%) (25.3%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
3.8 members 0.1 members 3.9 members 
$7.5m to $1.3bill 323 3 326 
N =67 (30.5%) (0.3%) (30.8%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
4.9 members 0.0 members 4.9 members 
Total 1045 14 1059 
(98.7%) (1.3%) (100.0%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
4.0 members 0.1 members 4.1 members 
Table 3 reports board composition by stakeholder type and industry. There 
is no clear difference as to the proportion of shareholder directors, option 
holding directors and professional directors within each ofthe three industry 
groups, gold, other mining and energy. What is interesting is that while the 
average size of energy IPOs is not much different to the other sectors, 
their overall board size is nearly 10% bigger on average. 
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Table 3: Board Composition by Stakeholder Type and Industry. 
Sample Size· 1994 to 2004 
260 Directors 
Companies by Shareholder Option Professional Total 
Industry Directors Holding Directors Directors 
Directors 
Gold Mining 279 63 36 378 
N = 92 (26.4%) (5.9%) (3.4%) (35.7%) 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$1590.0m 3.0 members 0.7 members 0.4 members 4.1 members 
Other Mining 376 59 49 * 484 
N = 123 (35.5%) (5.7%) (4.6%) (45.8%) 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$2679.4m 3.1 members 0.5 members 0.4 members 4.0 members 
Energy 145 25 27 197 
N =45 (13.7%) (2.4%) (2.5%) (18.6%) 
Total Raised Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
$754.7m 3.2 members 0.6 members 0.6 members 4.4 members 
Total 800 147 112 1059 
(75.6%) (13.9%) (10.5%) (100.0%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
3.1 members 0.6 members 0.4 members 4.1 members 
* 1 public stakeholder director included. 
Table 4 reports board composition by gender and industry. Each of the 
three sectors does not employ many women at all. The energy sector has 
the fewest of these sectors, it employed only one women, of 197 directors 
in total in 45 IPOs in total. 
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Table 4: Board Composition by Gender and Industry. 
Sample Size· 260 1994 to 2000 Directors 
Companies by Men Women Total Industries 
Gold Mining 371 6 377 
N =92 (35.0%) (0.6%) (35.6%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
4.0 members 0.1 members 4.1 members 
Other Mining 478 7 485 
N = 123 (45.1%) (0.7%) (45.8%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
3.9 members 0.1 members 4.0 members 
Energy 196 1 197 
N=45 (18.5%) (0.1%) (18.6%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
4.4 members 0.0 members 4.4 members 
Total 1045 14 1059 
(98.7%) (1.3%) (100.0%) 
Ave. per board Ave. per board Ave. board size 
4.0 members 0.1 members 4.1 members 
4 Conclusion 
The findings of this research confirm the paucity of public stakeholder 
directors and women directors on the boards of directors of Australian mining 
and energy company IPOs. The near absence of public stakeholder directors 
in the three industry sectors that would be expected to be particularly publicly 
sensitive industry sectors and subject to a high degree of public scrutiny is 
surprising. We are not, however, suggesting that the shareholder directors, 
option holding directors and professional directors are not acting in the 
best interests of all stakeholders. 
The low proportional representation of women directors on the boards of 
mining and energy IPOs finding confirms the smaller sample findings of 
Dimovski and Brooks (2004). At this stage we can only speculate that the 
low proportion of women on such boards may be related to the skill set 
required of such directors, that is, that women directors may not presently 
have the business and financial experience and expertise required of such 
directors. As more women identify such senior business opportunities and 
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develop their business and financial skills and as more firms recognize the 
value that women directors may bring, we also speculate that there will be 
more women directors on mining and energy IPO boards. Future studies 
may investigate this and may also investigate the numbers and proportions 
of women executive and non-executive directors. 
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